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The Effect of the Dodd–Frank Act  
on Arbitration Agreements: 




“[I]n today’s regulatory environment, it’s virtually impossible to violate rules. . . .  But 
it’s impossible for a violation to go undetected, certainly not for a considerable period of 
time.” 
~Bernie Madoff, October 20, 2007.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 3, 1929, the Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked at a 
historic 381.2 points, but by November 13, 1929, the market fell 199 points, 
creating a selling hemorrhage that would define the next decade of life in the 
United States.2  When the market bottomed out in 1932, American stocks 
had lost 90% of their value, leaving President Franklin Roosevelt and 
Congress with the task of rebuilding both the trading capability of the 
nation’s securities exchanges and the public’s confidence in the market.3 
Prior to the market crash of 1929, there was no need for extensive 
securities regulation due to the prosperous post-World War I economy.4  It 
was not until approximately $25 billion in wealth had been lost that the need 
for oversight became a legislative priority.5  Born out of the crisis of the 
 
* Catherine Moore is a J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1. Bernard Madoff, The Philoctetes Center Roundtable Discussion: The Future of the Stock 
Market 9 (Oct. 20, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.philoctetes.org/documents/Stock%20Market.pdf). 
 2. Harold Bierman, Jr., The 1929 Stock Market Crash, ECON. HIST. ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2010, 4:13 
PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/bierman.crash. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  During the 1920s, an unprecedented 20 million shareholders invested in American 
securities.  Id. 
 5. Id. 
1
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Great Depression, sweeping regulatory reforms were enacted with the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6 
In the fall of 2008, the American economy experienced a historic 
number of shockwaves: Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System bailed out AIG, Bernie Madoff admitted to 
masterminding the greatest Ponzi scheme in history, and Congress passed 
what seemed to be an unending number of industry bailouts.7  Much like the 
crash of 1929, the government was too late in curbing ineffective policies 
and regulations that ultimately contributed to the vast destruction of private 
and public wealth.  As a result, the United States experienced its first true 
recession of the new century.  It became clear to politicians, bankers, and 
investors that the United States was, once again, in need of a substantial 
reform to the financial system. 
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd–
Frank8 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank or 
Act).9  The Act addresses everything from eliminating future bailouts to 
excessive executive compensation and predatory lending, with the ultimate 
aim of protecting consumers and preventing future economic meltdowns like 
that of 2008.10  President Obama said the reform legislation was meant to 
“empower consumers and investors, to bring the shadowy deals that caused 
this [2008 financial] crisis into the light of day, and to put a stop to taxpayer 
bailouts once and for all. . . .  [T]hese reforms represent the strongest 
consumer financial protections in history.”11  The legislation ushered in the 
 
 6. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Apr. 11, 2012).  The Acts of 1933 and 1934 
were designed to give investors and the market accurate information, and to ensure fair business 
practices.  Id.  It was the 1934 Act that established the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Id.  
President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Joseph Kennedy as the first Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  Id. 
 7. See 10 Weeks of Financial Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/09/27/business/economy/20080927_WEEKS_TIMELINE
.html. 
 8. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at 
B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html.  The Act was named 
for Representative Barney Frank (D, MA) and Senator Chris Dodd (D, CT).  Id.  Frank served as 
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee that helped  create and pass the eight acts that 
became the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Id.  Frank was also the chairman of 
crucial committees involved in passing the legislation.  Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, (July 21, 2010) (transcript available at 
2
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most sweeping overhaul of the American financial system since the Great 
Depression.12 
Dodd–Frank is set to change the landscape of arbitration agreements in 
the securities industry.13  The Act signals a shift away from the past twenty 
years of federal policy and precedent favoring arbitration of securities 
disputes.14  The reform measures address arbitration agreements generally, 
while specifically attacking the validity of mandatory arbitration agreements 
between financial professionals and consumers in a number of contexts 
including home loans, credit disputes, mortgage agreements, and securities 
fraud.15  The measures are meant to be a common-sense remedy to the 
increasingly frequent problem of compelled arbitration of main street 
consumers by sophisticated and highly profitable Wall Street firms.16  These 
measures are of particular importance given the rapidly growing number of 
securities dispute claims that have been brought in the past two years and the 
prevalence of mandatory arbitration agreements in retail financial products 
and services.17 
Part I of this article will discuss the development of statutes and case 
law regarding arbitration of securities disputes and the precedent of the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of securities disputes.  
Part II will discuss the changes to arbitration law brought by the Dodd–
Frank Act.  Part III will discuss Congressional intent and analyze the likely 
results of Dodd–Frank arbitration reform.  Part IV will make proposals about 




 12. Michelle Lodge, Dodd–Frank Act Needs a ‘Good Hearing’: Chris Dodd, CNBC (Feb. 1, 
2011, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41374332/Dodd_Frank_Act_Needs_a_Good_Hearing_Chris_Dodd. 
 13. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
 14. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 15. Tamara Hoffbuhr-Seelman, The Future of Mandatory Securities Arbitration Under the 
Dodd–Frank Act, 13 BUS. SUIT, no. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.fwlaw.com/Securities_Arbitration_Under_Dodd-Frank.pdf. 
 16. Id.  In order to open an account with a securities broker, a customer usually has to agree to 
predispute arbitration before FINRA.  Id.  Agreements signed before 2007 most likely have a similar 
predispute arbitration clause, but the arbitration hearing is most likely agreed to be in front of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  Id. 
 17. Id.  According to FINRA, arbitration filings increased 43% from 2008 (4,982 filings) to 
2009 (7,137 filings).  Id. 
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consumer and fulfill the intent of the legislation.  Part V will conclude this 
article. 
II. HISTORY AND STATUS QUO OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BEFORE 
DODD–FRANK 
A. History of Arbitration Agreements in Securities Disputes 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act and the Early Preference for the 
Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925 established a policy of 
favoring arbitration agreements18 and required courts to enforce agreements 
to arbitrate securities disputes.19  The FAA required the validity and 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in “a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce.”20  The aim of the FAA was to avoid the 
litigation process in favor of a streamlined arbitration proceeding that 
decreased both the time and financial investment in the dispute.21  The FAA 
 
 18. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2012). 
 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
 
Id. § 2. 
 19. Edward P. Boyle, Matthew T. McLaughlin & David N. Cinotti, Federal Arbitration Act 
Alert: Dodd–Frank Act Gives SEC and New Consumer Agency Power to Invalidate Arbitration 
Agreements, VENABLE (Aug. 2010), http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/4e664f50-268b-
44b7-8d59-c2669678e352/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e6505394-0977-4d0a-ba99-
c88d5762a604/Federal_Arbitration_Act_Alert_8-9-10.pdf. 
 20. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 21. This was a decisive departure from previous judicial opinions toward arbitration 
proceedings.  Jon O. Shimabukuro, The Federal Arbitration Act: Background and Recent 
Developments, CRS REP. CONGRESS 1 (Aug. 15, 2003), 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs3879/m1/1/high_res_d/RL30934_2003Aug15.pdf. 
Scholars believe this hostility was a product of the English court’s disfavor of arbitration 
agreements.  Id. at 2.  Because arbitration decreased a judge’s caseload and judges were paid for 
each case they resolved, arbitration agreements cut into their livelihood.  Id.  Attitudes changed with 
the expanding post-war American economy and culminated with President Calvin Coolidge signing 
the FAA on February 12, 1925.  Id.  While one of the primary purposes of the FAA was to decrease 
4
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sought to enforce arbitration agreements with the same vigor as other 
contracts.22  From 1925 to 1953, predispute arbitration agreements were 
regularly enforced in the securities industry.23 
2. Wilko v. Swan: A First Step at Invalidating Arbitration Agreements 
Turning against the precedent of the FAA, in Wilko v. Swan, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that mandatory predispute clauses could not force 
investors to resolve their claims through arbitration.24  In Wilko, petitioner, a 
customer of respondent’s securities brokerage firm, sued to recover damages 
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.25  Petitioner sought 
damages claiming the firm’s misrepresentations and omissions induced both 
his decision to invest in 1,600 shares of common stock in Air Associates, 
Inc. and subsequent sale of stock at a loss.26  Respondent did not answer the 
complaint and instead moved to stay the trial until arbitration in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement could be conducted.27  The Court held that 
the right to select a judicial forum cannot be validly waived and that an 
agreement to arbitrate future controversies between buyers and securities 
brokers is a stipulation that binds the buyer to waive compliance with the 
Securities Act;28 thus, any such agreement is invalidated by the Act’s 
 
litigation and streamline the dispute process, the FAA remains a litigated topic.  Id. at 1.  Since 2000, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has heard six cases on the FAA.  Id. 
 22. While the Federal Arbitration Act does not specifically mention the enforceability of 
predispute agreements to arbitrate, such agreements were upheld following the passage of the FAA.  
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. 96, 68th Cong. (1st Sess. 
1924)). 
 23. E-mail from Peter J. Mougey, President, Pub. Investors Arbitration Bar Ass’n, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 3, 2010) [hereinafter E-mail to SEC], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/pre-dispute-arbitration/predisputearbitration-11.pdf. 
 24. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953). 
 25. Id. at 428. 
 26. Id. at 428-29. 
 27. Id. at 429.  An affidavit accompanied the motion stating that the parties’ relationship was 
controlled by the terms of the agreements and that while the firm was willing to arbitrate, petitioner 
had failed to seek or proceed with any arbitration of the controversy.  Id. at 429.  The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that the agreement to arbitrate deprived petitioner 
of a judicial remedy guaranteed in the Securities Act and denied the stay.  Id. at 430.  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.  Id. 
 28. Justice Reed states that section 14 and the other protective provisions of the Securities Act 
require “the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness . . . Congress must have 
intended [section] 14 . . . to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review.”  Id. at 437.  Section 14 of 
the Securities Act states: “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any 
5
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express provisions against waiver.29  In the wake of Wilko, arbitration of 
securities disputes brought under the Securities Act of 1933 was voluntary.30  
Following this decision, courts interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding to 
also apply to cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.31 
3. Added Protections for Consumers Against Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements 
In 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) advised brokerage firms that requiring arbitration agreements 
without adequate disclosure as to the effects of such agreements is a 
violation of fair dealing.32  Further increasing the cause of customer 
disclosure, in 1983 the Exchange Act Rule 15c2-2 was adopted to address 
what had become the industry norm of including predispute arbitration 
agreements in customer brokerage agreements.33  These measures meant that 
when arbitration agreements were included in a securities agreement, 
customers had to be made aware of this fact and potential consequences.34 
In 1973, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)—now part 
of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)—adopted the 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure (NASD code).35  Section 12 of the 
 
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of 
the Commission shall be void.”  Id. at 430 n.6. 
 29. Id. at 434-36.  When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives 
his right to sue in court, he gives up more than a participant would in other business transactions.  Id. 
at 435.  The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue.  Id.  He thus surrenders one of 
the advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the weight 
of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary.  Id. 
 30. E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
 31. Id. (Wilko was decided in the context of the Securities Act of 1933).  See also Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying the 
same holding and rationale to cases arising under the 1934 Act). 
 32. Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements Which Provide for 
Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, 17 SEC Docket 1167, at *4 (July 
2, 1979). 
 33. Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer 
Customer Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 25,034, 39 SEC Docket 527, at *1 (Oct. 15, 
1987). 
 34. Id. 
 35. NASD Code of Arbitration, FINRA, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbrul/documents/arbmed/p0186
53.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).  The NASD Code was effectively adopted in 1973 though notice 
was sent to members in 1968.  Id. 
6
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NASD code requires that if desired by a customer, a member36 must submit 
a dispute to arbitration.37  This code section meant that while brokerage 
firms could not compel arbitration through predispute agreements, customers 
with claims under federal securities law could compel firms to arbitrate their 
claims.  Since the adoption of the NASD code, in the absence of predispute 
arbitration agreements, customers can select to arbitrate or litigate.38 
4. McMahon and the Revival of Arbitration Enforcement 
In 1987, the Supreme Court reversed Wilko39 and decades of case law 
concerning the enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses brought under 
the Securities Act of 1934 in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.40  
The 5–4 decision held that claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Act 
were arbitrable under predispute arbitration agreements.41  Between 1980 
and 1982, respondents Eugene and Julia McMahon were customers of 
 
 36. For a current list of FINRA members, see FINRA List of Members, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/MemberFirms/ListOfMembers/p012908 (last updated Apr. 4, 
2012). 
 37. NASD Code of Arbitration, supra note 35.  Today this provision exists as FINRA Rule 
12200.  Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of FINRA: 
 
Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if: 
 
Arbitration under the Code is either: 
 
(1) Required by a written agreement, or 
 
(2) Requested by the customer; 
 
The dispute is between a customer and a member or associated person of a 
member; and 
 
The dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the member or the 
associated person, except disputes involving the insurance business activities 
of a member that is also an insurance company. 
 
Id. at 13. 
 38. Id. 
 39. The Wilko holding was officially overruled in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 40. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987). 
 41. Id. 
7
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Shearson, a brokerage firm.42  Julia McMahon signed two customer 
agreements stating that any controversy relating to the accounts with 
Shearson would be resolved through arbitration.43  In 1984, the McMahons 
filed a complaint alleging that defendant had violated section 10(b)(5) of the 
Exchange Act by engaging in fraudulent and excessive trading on 
respondents’ accounts.44  The defendant moved to compel arbitration under 
section 3 of the FAA.45  The Court found that the FAA mandates 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.46  Concluding that 
Congress did not intend for section 29(a) of the Exchange Act to bar 
enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements, the Court found that 
where the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is 
adequate to preserve Exchange Act rights, enforcement does not constitute a 
waiver of provisions within the Exchange Act.47  The result of McMahon is 
that brokerage firms have the ability to strong-arm consumers into 
arbitration through the use of predispute arbitration agreements.48 
5. The Status Quo: FINRA and the Federal Preference for the 
Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 
a. The Growing Numbers of American Investors and the Shrinking 
Number of Dispute Resolution Forums 
Absent an agreement expressly prohibiting arbitration, consumers are 
typically compelled to FINRA arbitration should they have a dispute 
 
 42. Id. at 222-23. 
 43. Id. at 223. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 226.  The Court found that “the burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show 
that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”  Id. 
at 227. 
 47. Id. at 238.  Crucial to this holding was the Court’s discussion of the evolution of 
arbitration since the Wilko opinion.  Id.  When Wilko was decided, the SEC had limited authority 
over the rules of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), and the SEC’s authority did not include 
authority over their arbitration rules.  Id.  In 1975, the SEC amended section 19 of the Exchange Act, 
giving the Commission expanded powers to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures used 
by SROs.  Id.  For example, the SEC can add, delete, or change any rule promulgated by any SRO if 
it finds such changes are required by the Exchange Act.  Id.  The Court found that these expanded 
powers of the SEC ensure the rights of consumers and mark a significant change in the landscape of 
arbitration.  Id. 
 48. At the time of the McMahon decision, a House of Representatives commission found that 
98% of margin accounts, 95% of options accounts, and 39% of cash accounts carried predispute 
arbitration clauses.  E-mail to SEC, supra note 23, at n.24. 
8
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regarding their security investments.  The preference for enforceable 
predispute arbitration agreements is noteworthy given how the demographic 
of the average investor has changed in the last twenty years.49  The number 
of American households investing has increased threefold since McMahon, 
with nearly half of all U.S. households owning stocks or mutual funds.50  
Investment in securities is no longer as restricted as it was when the 
Supreme Court affirmed the preference for arbitration enforceability.51  Also, 
while the investment market has expanded, the number of arbitration forums 
has shrunk to one—FINRA.52  Thus, there are more consumers signing 
predispute arbitration agreements and only one forum in which they can 
settle their disputes. 
b. Inequity in Arbitration Proceedings and the Necessity for Reform 
It is significant that FINRA is the only arbitration provider for 
consumer–broker disputes given the nature of FINRA arbitration and what 
some consumers feel is a biased system that favors the interests of industry 
defendants over the interests of consumers.53  At the core of the allegations 
of bias is the fact that in three-member arbitration panels, one member is 
part of the securities industry because they are a FINRA member.54  
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  At the time of McMahon, there were at least ten arbitration forums including forums in 
the major stock exchanges and the Chicago Board of Options Exchange.  Id.  Additionally, these 
different arbitration forums had varying rules, administrators, and policies, all of which increased 
consumer choice.  Id. 
 53. On October 6, 2008, FINRA launched a two-year pilot program that allowed for public 
arbitration panels for securities disputes.  Public Arbitrator Pilot Program Frequently Asked 
Questions, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Rules/RuleGuidance/NoticestoParties/P1
24055 (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).  The program allowed for investors using a three-member 
arbitration panel to have three, rather than two, arbitrators.  Id.  Normally, one seat is reserved for a 
FINRA member.  Id.  FINRA stopped accepting applications for the program on February 1, 2011.  
Id.  This program represents a timely response from the securities industry to the growing issue of 
arbitration equality.  Id. 
 54. Hoffbuhr-Seelman, supra note 15.  The other two members are public arbitrators.  Id.  One 
study took into account not only a strict win–lose model, but also looked at the dollar figure 
recovered versus the size of the claim.  See Edward S. O’Neal & Daniel R. Solin, Mandatory 
Arbitration of Securities Disputes: A Statistical Analysis of How Claimants Fare, SEC. LITIG. & 
CONSULTING GROUP (June 2007), available at 
9
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FINRA’s membership is entirely comprised of securities traders and 
brokers.55 
In 2009, the Arbitration Fairness Act56 (AFA) was introduced in the 
House of Representatives.57  The AFA58 listed a number of findings to 
explain why Dodd–Frank, introduced after the AFA failed to pass, was 
necessary to amend dispute resolution practices in the securities industry and 
the court’s recent interpretation of the FAA.59  First, the AFA found that the 
FAA was meant to apply to disputes between commercial entities of similar 
sophistication and bargaining power.60  Despite the intention of the AFA’s 
designers, Supreme Court precedent has allowed the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements between dissimilar parties with unequal economic 
power.61  Given this misinterpretation, millions of consumers surrender their 
 
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Mandatory%20Arbitration%20Study.pdf.  The study found 
a few notable facts.  First, the study found that a claimant is 39% likely to win against a top three 
brokerage firm, while they are 57% likely to win against a firm that is not a top twenty firm.  Id. at 
9-10.  The study’s data also suggest that the awards are going down, even in cases where a claimant 
prevails.  In 1998, a successful claimant got an average of 68% of the requested amount.  Id. at 11.  
Today that figure has fallen to 50%.  Id.  Additionally, the larger the request amount, the less likely a 
claimant is to get a high recovery.  For example, if the successful claimant requests less than 
$10,000, they will get an average of 76% of their request.  Id. at 12.  However, if the request is 
between $100,000 and $250,000, they will average 52%; if the request is more than $250,000 they 
will average 37%.  Id. 
 55. FINRA oversees nearly 4,430 brokerage firms and almost 630,000 securities 
representatives.  About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFinra/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
 56. Testimony of Congressman Henry C. “Hank” Johnson: Arbitration Hearing on 
“Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Voluntary?”, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Sept. 
15, 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Johnson090915.pdf.  The Arbitration 
Fairness Act was introduced by Representative Henry C. “Hank” Johnson.  Id.  The bill was 
intended to prevent the enforceability of any mandatory predispute arbitration agreements.  Id.  The 
bill would give customers the choice to arbitrate if that was their wish.  Id.  In his September 15, 
2009 testimony to the House Commercial and Administrative Law Committee, Representative 
Johnson cited the findings of the National Arbitration Forum and the American Arbitration 
Association, both of which had previously concluded that mandatory predispute arbitration is 
fundamentally unfair to consumers.  Id.  Representative Johnson’s testimony also argued for the 
elimination of mandatory predispute arbitration in the context of employment and franchisee 
agreements.  Id. 
 57. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1020:. 
 58. The AFA was designed to amend 9 U.S.C. § 1.  Id. 
 59. Id.  The AFA, introduced to the 111th Congress on February 12, 2009, was not passed by 
Congress. 
 60. Id. at § 2(1) (The Federal Arbitration Act was “intended to apply to disputes between 
commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power”).  Id. 
 61. Id. at § 2(7). 
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right to litigation before a conflict has arisen between them and the well-
funded financial institution they wish to sue.  Additionally, the AFA found 
that most consumers and employees were not given any option whether to 
submit their claims to arbitration; the fine print in standard contracts like 
employment and brokerage agreements are not thoroughly investigated by 
signers who forfeit their rights leaving them with no choice but arbitration.62  
Further, given that the process of arbitration feeds claims through private 
arbitration companies, the AFA found that the providers of arbitration 
services may be pressured to favor companies who are repeat users of 
arbitration services.63  Finally, the AFA found that, unlike the litigation 
system, arbitration is relatively nontransparent64 and lacks judicial review.65  
While Dodd–Frank is not explicitly based on the language and findings of 
the AFA, it is fair to suggest that the AFA was an ideological precursor to 
arbitration provisions in Dodd–Frank. 
 
Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt 
the systems against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of substantive 
statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of 
miles from their homes.  While some courts have been protective of individuals, too 
many courts have upheld even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration clauses in 




 62. Id. at § 2(3). 
 
Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to submit 
their claims to arbitration.  Few people realize, or understand the importance of the 
deliberately fine print that strips them of rights; and because entire industries are adopting 
these clauses, people increasingly have no choice but to accept them.  They must often 
give up their rights as a condition of having a job, getting necessary medical care, buying 
a car, opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and the like.  Often times, they are 
not even aware that they have given up their rights. 
 
Id. 
 63. Id. at § 2(4) (“Private arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to devise 
systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those companies will receive 
their lucrative business.”). 
 64. Id. at § 2(6) (“Mandatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights and 
consumer rights because it is not transparent. While the American civil justice system features 
publicly accountable decision makers who generally issue written decisions that are widely available 
to the public, arbitration offers none of these features.”). 
 65. Id. at § 2(5) (“[B]ecause there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions[,] . 
. . arbitrators enjoy near complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules.”). 
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II. ARBITRATION REFORMS BROUGHT BY THE DODD–FRANK ACT: A 
REACTION TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE PROBLEMS 
INHERENT TO THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
A. Expanded Powers of the SEC and the Attack on Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements 
Dodd–Frank affects federal arbitration law in a number of areas.  
Section 921 prohibits predispute arbitration agreements between customers 
and brokers, dealers, or investment advisors.66  Sections 748 and 922 
prohibit such agreements brought following whistleblower claims of 
commodities and securities fraud.67  Section 1028 orders the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection68 to study the use of predispute arbitration 
provisions in consumer financial services and grants the power to prohibit 
such provisions.69  Section 1414 prohibits such agreements in residential 
mortgages and home equity loans.70 
Dodd–Frank recalibrates the use of arbitration in securities disputes, but 
also expands the reach and might of the SEC.71  The vastly increased SEC 
budget has the potential to increase the number as well as the complexity of 
the cases the Commission reviews and litigates.72  Given this capability, it is 
likely that Congress intended for more claims to be pursued and remedied in 
the court system. 
 
 66. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (“Authority to 
restrict mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.”). 
 67. Dodd–Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-49 (“Whistleblower protection.”); Dodd–Frank 
Act § 748, 124 Stat. at 1739-46 (“Commodity whistleblower incentives and protection.”). 
 68. Dodd–Frank Act § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964-65 (“Establishment of the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection.”). 
 69. Dodd–Frank Act § 1028, 124 Stat. at 2003-04 (“Authority to restrict mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration.”). 
 70. Dodd–Frank Act § 1414, 124 Stat. at 2149-53 (“Additional standards and requirements.”). 
 71. Scott Hirst, Investor Protection Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 11, 2010, 12:11 PM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/11/investor-protection-provisions-of-the-Dodd-Frank-
act/.  The Dodd–Frank Act § 991 authorizes a series of increases that will double the SEC budget in 
the five years following the Act’s passage.  Id.  The 2011 SEC budget is authorized to be $1.3 
billion, and the 2015 budget is authorized to be $2.25 billion.  Id.  These increasing budget figures 
will not be drawn from tax dollars, but from already existing transaction and registration fees.  Id.  
Under the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC will also be able to use the SEC “Reserve Fund” to meet and 
supplement various costs.  Id.  This Fund will hold $100 million and will be replenished with $50 
million annually.  Id.  This money will come out of SEC income from fees.  Id. 
 72. Id. 
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1. Section 921 
Section 92173 amends both section 15 of the Securities Act of 1934 and 
section 205 of the Investment Advisors Act of 194074 by allowing the SEC 
to prohibit or limit the use of arbitration agreements used by brokers, 
dealers, or securities traders that arise under the federal securities laws or the 
rules of a self-regulatory organization—such as FINRA—if such conditions 
are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.75  The practical 
result of section 921 is that the SEC will decide how mandatory arbitration 
claims will be resolved.  Should the SEC limit the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, investors will have greater access to the court system which, 
unlike arbitration, allows for robust discovery, use of juries, precedent, and 
judicial review.76 
2. Section 922 
Section 922 increases the protections awarded to securities fraud 
whistleblowers77 and incentivizes whistleblowing activity with increased 
awards for the successful prosecution of securities violations.78  Under this 
section, a whistleblower is entitled to 10%–30% of monies recovered by the 
SEC if the whistleblower’s tip results in an enforcement action of more than 
$1 million.79  For a whistleblower to recover a percentage of the sanction, 
 
 73. Hoffbuhr-Seelman, supra note 15.  Section 921 gives the SEC authority to limit or prohibit 
predispute arbitration agreements, but until the SEC adopts a contrary rule, such agreements will 
remain valid.  Id. 
 74. Client Memorandum: Securities Litigation Implications of the Dodd–Frank Act, 
PAULWEISS.COM, 2 (July 9, 2010), http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/f5ecf56a-abc8-41ac-
91ff-5ff45d8f999b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9ec05d67-8bd2-476e-93ee-670fe7dd0300/9-
Jul-10FRB.pdf. 
 75. Dodd–Frank Act § 921, 124 Stat. at 1841. 
 76. Hirst, supra note 71. 
 77. Dodd–Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-49 (defining whistleblowers as “any individual 
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation 
of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission”). 
 78. Dodd–Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-49. 
 79. Dodd–Frank Act § 922(b)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. at 1842.  The amount of the award or the denial 
of the award is left to the discretion of the Commission.  Dodd–Frank Act § 922(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 
1842-43.  In determining the award the Commission will consider: 
 
(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the 
covered judicial or administrative action; (II) the degree of assistance provided by the 
13
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the whistleblower must provide the SEC with information that it did not 
already have from another source.80  The Act does not require 
whistleblowers to identify themselves at the time of reporting the violation 
to the SEC.81  Section 922 precludes the waiver of any rights and remedies 
provided for by the Dodd–Frank reform by way of “any agreement, policy 
form, or condition of employment including by a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement.”82  Paralleling the purpose of section 922 is section 748 which is 
a provision on whistleblower incentives and protections in the commodities 
markets.83 
Interestingly, section 922 has been applied retroactively to 
whistleblower cases brought before the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act.  In 
Pezza v. Investors Capital Corp., the court held that section 922 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act should be applied to a Sarbanes-Oxley securities violation 
that occurred prior to the legislation’s 2010 enactment.84  The Dodd–Frank 
Act was enacted while the defendants in this case were moving to compel 
arbitration; plaintiff successfully argued that the Dodd–Frank Act controlled 
the defendant’s ability to compel arbitration.85 
 
whistleblower and any legal representative of the whistleblower in a covered judicial or 
administrative action; (III) the programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring 
violations of the securities law by making awards to whistleblowers who provide 
information that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws; and (IV) such 
additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation; and (ii) 
shall not take into consideration the balance of the Fund. 
 
Id. 
 80. Richard Gallagher & Kenneth Herzinger, Securities Litigation Risks for Public Companies 
Arising from the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, ORRICK (July 29, 
2010), http://www.orrick.com/publications/item.asp?action=article&articleID=2863. 
 81. Dodd–Frank Act § 922(h)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1846-47 (“Except as provided in 
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the Commission and any officer or employee of the Commission shall 
not disclose any information, including information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, 
which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower . . . .”).  
 82. Dodd–Frank Act § 922(j)(c)(2)(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 1848. 
 83. Dodd–Frank Act section 748 amends the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).  
“The rights and remedies provided for in this section may not be waived by any agreement, policy 
form, or condition of employment including by a predispute arbitration agreement.”  Dodd–Frank 
Act § 748(n)(1), 124 Stat. at 1746.  “No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or 
enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”  Dodd–
Frank Act § 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. at 1746. 
 84. Ethan Mark, Court Holds Dodd–Frank Ban on Arbitration of Whistleblower Claims Is 
Retroactive, DODD-FRANK.COM (March 3, 2011), http://Dodd-Frank.com/court-holds-Dodd-Frank-
ban-on-arbitration-of-whistleblower-claims-is-retroactive/. 
 85. Id. 
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3. Section 1028 
Section 1028 gives the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(Bureau) powers similar to those granted the SEC in section 921.86  The 
Bureau is to study the use of predispute arbitration agreements in the context 
of consumer financial products.87  The Bureau will be able to enact 
legislation regarding the study’s finding after reporting the results to 
Congress.88  The Act specifies that the report will study the practices of the 
“covered person,” meaning individuals or companies that offer consumer 
financial products.89  “Consumer financial product or service” is defined to 
include: deposit-taking, extension of loans or credit, real estate settlement 
services, and financial advising outside of the securities industry.90  Section 
1028 does not prohibit a person from entering a voluntary arbitration 
agreement with a covered person after a dispute has begun.91 
4. Section 1414 
Section 1414 amends section 129C of the Truth in Lending Act by 
adding a number of subsections addressing arbitration of claims in 
residential mortgage loans or consumer credit actions.92  This section flatly 
prohibits mandatory arbitration or other nonjudicial procedures for resolving 
 
 86. See Boyle, McLaughlin & Cinotti, supra note 19, at 1-2. 
 87. Dodd–Frank Act § 1028(a), 124 Stat. at 2003-04 (“The Bureau shall conduct a study of, 
and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of 
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection with the offering or 
providing of consumer financial products of services.”). 
 88. Dodd–Frank Act § 1028(b), 124 Stat. at 2004. 
 
The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of 
an agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product 
or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the 
Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers.  The findings in such rule shall be 
consistent with the study conducted under subsection (a).  
 
Id. 
 89. Dodd–Frank Act § 1002(6), 124 Stat. at 1956. 
 90. Dodd–Frank Act § 1002(5), (15), 124 Stat. at 1956, 1957-60. 
 91. Dodd–Frank Act § 1028(c), 124 Stat. at 2004 (“The authority described in subsection (b) 
may not be construed to prohibit or restrict a consumer from entering into a voluntary arbitration 
agreement with a covered person after a dispute has arisen.”). 
 92. Dodd–Frank Act § 1414(e), 124 Stat. at 2151. 
15
Moore: The Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on Arbitration Agreements: A Pro
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2012
 518 
claims involving residential mortgage loans and open-end consumer credit 
plans.93  Like section 1028, section 1414 specifically states it does not limit 
the right of the consumer or creditor to agree to arbitration after a claim has 
been made.94 
III. DODD–FRANK’S LIKELY CONSEQUENCES 
From the above sections of the Dodd–Frank Act, it is clear that 
Congress unfavorably looks upon mandatory arbitration and predispute 
agreements.  The Act can only lead one to see that Congress intends to 
curtail the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the securities industry 
while also notifying Wall Street to be on notice for increased accountability 
and litigation.95 
A. Effect on Costs of Resolving Securities Cases 
As Dodd–Frank invalidates or curbs arbitration agreements, thus 
providing for increased litigation over securities claims, it seems likely that 
resolving securities cases has the potential to become more expensive and 
time consuming.96  As the purpose of the Act was to protect the interests of 
consumers, as opposed to those of financial institutions, it is crucial to ask if 
the Act will have a positive effect on individuals hoping to bring securities 
claims.  As this article advocates, consumer choice must become the 
standard for dispute resolution in the securities industry.  Recognizing the 
importance of the freedom to litigate, it is also crucial to recognize that even 
if investors and consumers choose to litigate their claims, they are not 
 
 93. Dodd–Frank Act § 1414(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 2151 (“No residential mortgage loan and no 
extension of credit under an open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the 
consumer may include terms which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the 
method for resolving any controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”).  
 94. Dodd–Frank Act § 1414(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 2151 (“Subject to paragraph (3), paragraph (1) 
shall not be construed as limiting the right of the consumer and the creditor or any assignee to agree 
to arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy at any 
time after a dispute or claim under the transaction arises.”). 
 95. Dodd–Frank requires the SEC to study the standard of care required by financial advisors 
and brokers to determine if regulatory gaps exist.  Edward Pekarek & Christine Goodrich, A (Dodd–
)Frank Primer of Some Imminent Regulatory Reforms, N.Y. ST. B.A. BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010, 10:35 
PM),http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2010/11/a_doddfrank_primer_of_some_imm.html.  
The study should examine the financial literacy of average investors and determine an appropriate 
standard of care that financial professionals owe their customers.  Id.  After concluding the study, the 
SEC has the power to impose new fiduciary duties on brokers.  Id.  Presumably, the SEC’s study 
will include a determination of investor awareness of mandatory arbitration clauses in financial 
services and products contracts. 
 96. Id. 
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assured of a more favorable outcome than what they would get in arbitration 
nor are they guaranteed of any financial savings.97  Further, while consumers 
rightly argue that the arbitration process is imperfect, one can hardly argue 
that litigation is predictable or that litigation will be in the financial interests 
of the individual.98  In most instances, it will be the financial institution, as 
opposed to the individual consumer, who has the greater litigation 
resources.99  Should the language of Dodd–Frank be construed to allow 
financial institutions to force individuals into court, it would be more 
detrimental than the current status quo.100 
B. Increased Number of Class Action Lawsuits for Securities Claims 
Dodd–Frank might increase securities legislation generally but could 
also create class action securities suits for the first time in over two 
decades.101  Class action litigation was eliminated under mandatory 
arbitration framework because only individuals could bring arbitration 
claims.102  Given the potential for large classes of similarly situated 
plaintiffs, class action securities suits represent an effective method of relief 
for individuals who would otherwise be forced to arbitrate their claims 
individually.103  It can be assumed that Congress was aware of this potential 
side effect to a change in arbitration law and intended such measures to 
encourage responsible corporate behavior under an increased threat of large-
scale litigation. 
C. Impact of Whistleblower Provisions 
With section 922, Congress is signaling a shift in how the federal 
government wishes to enforce securities disputes.  Whistleblower provisions 
were in the 2001 Seaboard Guidelines and then again in 2002 in Sarbanes 
Oxley.104  These provisions were designed to encourage internal self-
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See 10 Weeks of Financial Turmoil, supra note 7. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Pamela S. Palmer, Joseph B. Farrell, Lawrence A. West & Melanie M. Blunschi, New 
Rewards for Whistleblowers, New Risks for Public Companies, LATHAM & WATKINS, 2 (Aug. 10, 
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regulation where employees reported violations to their employers.105  With 
incentivized whistleblowers, it will become less likely that corporations will 
internally resolve violations; instead, it is likely that corporations will be 
forced to resolve alleged violations after it has been reported to the SEC.106  
In fact, Dodd–Frank encourages exactly this behavior with the end goal of 
building cases against other parties through whistleblowing activities.107  
The whistleblowing legislation marks a new era of SEC enforcement and 
power, but for companies who are accused of wrongdoing, it signals a 
number of potential difficulties.108  For example, because the SEC will be 
notified of the alleged violation before the company is notified, the company 
will have to play catch up and could be in the position of having to defend 
itself prior to fully investigating the accusations.109  Further, because 
whistleblowers are financially encouraged to report companies, it is possible 
that some of these allegations will be proven false though the company will 
still be forced to defend itself.110 
D. Impact of State Law Regarding Securities Arbitration 
Dodd–Frank is aimed at reforming federal securities law, but because 
many securities claims are brought under state laws, the Dodd–Frank 
reforms will become the new model for state “Blue Sky” laws.111  Blue Sky 
laws are state-specific securities laws that govern securities trading and the 
licensing of brokers, firms, and advisors.112  New regulations ushered in by 
the Dodd–Frank reforms will serve as a model to both courts and 
legislatures.113  Given the visibility of Dodd–Frank and its outward hostility 
to mandatory predispute arbitration and compulsive arbitration generally, it 
is likely that state laws will follow this lead and could begin to step away 
 
2010), http://www.hrnsight.com/articles/tabid/66/docid/11045/Default.aspx.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
required corporations to give employees access to hotlines where they could report fraud.  Id. at 1.  
Any such reports were subject to review by the corporation’s internal audit committee.  Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Id. at 2-3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Richard I. Alvarez & Mark J. Astarita, Introduction to the Blue Sky Laws: Yes, There 
Are 50 Other Securities Regulators Other Than the SEC, SECLAW.COM, 
http://www.seclaw.com/bluesky.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
 112. Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last modified Sep. 27, 2000). 
 113. Pekarek & Goodrich, supra note 95. 
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from strict enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of securities 
law. 
IV. PROPOSALS ON HOW TO BEST IMPLEMENT THE CHANGES OF DODD–
FRANK AND WHY CONSUMER CHOICE MUST BE THE HALLMARK EMBRACED 
A. Arbitration, While Imperfect, Can Be Time and Cost Effective, and Thus, 
Must Remain an Option to Consumers 
The purpose of the Dodd–Frank Act is to protect the consumer, and as 
such, it would be unreasonable to absolutely take the choice of arbitration 
away from consumers bringing securities claims.  The Dodd–Frank Act does 
not flatly remove arbitration as a means of resolving disputes; rather, it 
provides for the limitation of mandatory arbitration.114  Such restrictions, as 
discussed above, are meant to protect the consumer.115  Arbitration, as a 
form of dispute resolution, must be differentiated from mandatory 
arbitration, a compulsory practice that often does not benefit the interests of 
the individual.116  This article briefly reviewed some of the shortcomings of 
arbitration proceedings; arbitration is an admittedly imperfect process, but 
given the cost of litigation, totally removing the option from consumers 
would only further restrict consumer choice.117  Arbitration proceedings are 
limited when compared to litigation, and thus, are often an effective way to 
control costs and are therefore appealing to consumers wanting to bring a 
lawsuit, but without the financial backing to match the resources of a 
brokerage firm or corporation.118 
The upsides of arbitration are especially apparent in the context of pro 
se claimants who are unable to afford the costs of hiring and retaining an 
attorney to see their claims through litigation.119  Arbitration recoveries, 
 
 114. See Dodd–Frank Act § 921, 124 Stat. at 1841; Dodd–Frank Act § 1028, 124 Stat. at 2003-
04. 
 115. See Stephen J. Nelson, Commentary: Dodd–Frank Hits Wall Street and Main Street, 
TRADERS MAG. (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/wall-street-main-Dodd-
Frank-consumer-protection-act-reform-106150-1.html. 
 116. E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  FINRA arbitrations are cost effective as discovery is truncated, motions are highly 
limited, prehearing motions to dismiss are discouraged, and depositions are not allowed absent a 
compelling reason.  Id. 
 119. Id. 
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measured by a percentage of claims recovered, have also been found more 
favorable to smaller claims.120  Further, depending on the amount of the 
claim, litigation may not be worth the potential recovery; thus, allowing for 
the continued use of arbitration provides an opportunity for smaller claims to 
be pursued more often.121  Unlike litigation, arbitration can also represent a 
time savings—FINRA arbitration takes an average of twelve months, 
exhibiting a significant reduction in time invested in the average case.122  
Further, FINRA has enacted procedures for expediting cases for ill or elderly 
customers.123 
While this article previously pointed out the fact that arbitration 
decisions are not subject to judicial review, this can be a positive aspect of 
the arbitration process for plaintiffs who feel that their case is exceptionally 
strong.124  The finality of the decision means that strong cases can be heard 
and given a final judgment that will not be subject to an appeals process.125  
Also, FINRA’s bylaws provide for failure to pay an arbitration agreement or 
written settlement agreement which further increases the efficacy of 
arbitration of securities claims.126 
 
 120. O’Neal, supra note 54. 
 121. See E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  NASD Dispute Resolution adopted these procedures beginning as a pilot program in 
NASD-DR’s Southeast Region in July 2003.  Press Release, FINRA, NASD Implements Expedited 
Dispute Resolution Proceedings for Elderly or Seriously Ill Parties (June 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2004/P002820. 
 124. E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Regulatory Notice 10-31, FINRA, Change to Expedited Proceedings for Failure to Comply 
with an Arbitration Award or Related Settlement (July 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p121647.pdf . 
 
Article XIII, Section 1(c) of FINRA’s Corporate Bylaws provides that a member or 
associated person may be disciplined for failure to pay an arbitration award or written 
settlement agreement.  Article VI, Section 3 permits summary suspension upon 15 days’ 
written notice of a member or associated person who fails to pay.  Recently, FINRA 
limited the defenses a firm or associated person may raise to prevent the suspension: (1) 
that the firm or person paid the award in full; (2) the customer has agreed to installment 
payments or has otherwise settled the matter; (3) the firm or person has filed a timely 
motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award and such motion has not been denied; 
and (4) the firm or person has filed a petition in bankruptcy and the bankruptcy 
proceeding is pending, or the bankruptcy court has discharged the award. 
 
E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
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B. Allowing Arbitration in Tandem with Litigation Could Resolve the 
Inadequacies of the Arbitration Process 
If consumers are given the choice between arbitration or litigation, this 
competition could have the effect of correcting some of what consumers feel 
are shortcomings in the arbitration process.127  Although this article 
advocates for the availability of consumer choice, given the burdensome 
costs of litigation and the uncertainty of prevailing, there is little reason to 
assume that allowing customer choice will flood the court systems with 
cases that would have previously gone to FINRA.128 
Arbitration is an imperfect process, but should the reforms of Dodd–
Frank be interpreted to eliminate securities arbitration altogether, it may 
actually have a chilling effect on the number of claims individuals bring 
given that corporations and companies will almost always have the upper 
hand financially and will be able to outspend an individual in the litigation 
process.129  For example, the cost and time savings offered by arbitration 
heavily sway the consumer to arbitration even if litigation is an option.130 
C. Consumer Choice Is the Best Solution 
This article advocates consumer choice rather than two-way choice 
wherein both the consumer and industry defendant have the right to 
determine the forum for resolution.131  If two-way choice is adopted, 
industry defendants can deny the consumer’s preference for arbitration 
knowing that litigation is beyond the financial abilities of the plaintiff.132  
Should parties from the securities industry have the ability to veto the 
consumer’s election for arbitration, the average consumer will remain 
powerless.  Given the language of sections 921, 922, 748, 1028, and 1414, it 
 
 127. E-mail to SEC, supra note 23. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Pekarek & Goodrich, supra note 95. 
 130. For example, the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 12510 does not allow for 
depositions except in exceptional circumstances.  NASD Code of Arbitration, supra note 35, at 40.  
Similarly, interrogatories are limited under Rule 12507(a)(1).  Id. at 38.  Such eliminations 
streamline the legal fees associated with FINRA arbitration. 
 131. See E-mail to SEC, supra note 23.  Two-way choice, which would be possible with the 
elimination of FINRA Rule 12200, would make court the default forum for securities arbitration.  Id.  
Under two-way choice, a consumer could desire arbitration only to be forced into court by the 
defendant.   Id. 
 132. Id. 
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becomes clear that Congress intended to ban mandatory predispute 
arbitration agreements, strongly discourage any mandatory arbitration 
agreements, and advocate for increased consumer choice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The full and lasting impact of Dodd–Frank and its arbitration provisions 
has yet to be seen.  Certain parts of the Act, like the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection, have been put beyond the reach of congressional 
budgetary cuts.133  Other reforms will be subject to conservative challenges. 
The problems and inequities of mandatory arbitration in the securities 
industry have gone on too long.  Dodd–Frank, drawing on decades of case 
precedent and the goals of the Arbitration Fairness Act, aims to overhaul the 
securities arbitration process by limiting the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements, incentivizing whistleblowers, banning certain predispute 
arbitration agreements, and creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection. 
This article acknowledges both the weakness and strengths of securities 
arbitration to conclude that if the Dodd–Frank Act is interpreted according to 
likely congressional intent, consumer choice will be the new standard of 
dispute resolution in the securities industry.  Continued use of arbitration 
and the opening of American courts should increase investor confidence, 
encourage the industry to behave in a responsible and accountable manner, 
and ultimately be one step in restoring investments in the American markets. 
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